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ABSTRACT 
RETHINKING HUMAN AND NONHUMAN ANIMAL RELATIONS IN J. M. 
COETZEE'S ELIZABETH COSTELLO (2003) 
Rodrigo Martini Paula 
August 1,2012 
For the past four decades, scholarship on the relationship between human and 
nonhuman animals has been growing inside the academy and sprouting ontological and 
epistemological concerns about the status of the Humanities as an institution. Between 
1997 and 2003, South-African author and Nobel Laureate 1. M. Coetzee created 
Elizabeth Costello, an Australian writer that delivers lectures at certain universities and 
causes controversy when addressing the nature of animal rights movements. This work 
aims at analyzing the situations in which Coetzce uses Costello to speak about the cruelty 
to nonhuman animals. What I argue is that in entering the conversation through the use of 
a fictional character, Coetzee puts the discourse of both philosophy an science in 
perspective and forces the reader to rethink the politics involved in the ways disciplines 
speak of animals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Elizabeth Costello sits at the middle of the dinner table, across from the President 
of Appleton University, where she is giving two academic lectures. As the guests eat the 
fettuccine with roasted eggplant-or the red snapper with baby potatoes, the choice of 
three guests-they discuss the first part of the lecture, presented earlier that day, on the 
relationship of dominance between human and nonhuman animals. Costello, a renowned 
author and scholar, engages in questions and discussions with the pool of guests 
composed primarily of university professors from various fields, including her son, a 
physicist, and her daughter-in-law, a philosopher skeptical of her work. As we see the 
scene unfold through the eyes of her son, we are presented with the varying and 
contradictory arguments on animal rights but also with a conversation between different 
disciplines on the status of nonhuman animals within the academy. 
1. M. Coetzee, the 2003 Nobel Laureate in Literature, presented two stories of 
Elizabeth Costello at Princeton University as part of his two Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (1997).' As both a writer and an accomplished literary critic,2 he was expected to 
deliver a philosophical essay on literary theory. In the epilogue of his 1. M. Coetzee and 
the Ethics of Reading (2004), Derek Attridge, one of the most accomplished scholars to 
delve into the works of Coetzee, notes the surprise of the audience that evening, 
'These lectures were later reprinted in Lives of Animals (1999) and Elizabeth Costello 
(2003). The version used in this analysis is the first reprint: Lives of Animals. 
2 At the time, Coetzee had taught Literary Theory at SUNY - Buffalo and at the 
University of Cape Town. 
"[Coetzee's] presence in an academic setting made one particularly conscious of 
his status as Professor of General Literature at the University of Cape Town" (192). Yet, 
he began his lecture with a fictional tale about an accomplished female Australian author 
who, when invited to deliver lectures on her works, shocked the audience by, instead, 
offering a philosophical inquiry into the state of factory-farming animals and, most 
shockingly, drawing on the radical comparison between the state of animals in our 
current economy and the conditions of the Jews during the Holocaust. 
This move of using a fictional character to talk about academic topics has been a 
constant in Coetzee's public appearances from the years of 1997 and 2003. He used the 
character of Elizabeth Costello in eight different scenarios to discuss topics of 
philosophy, animal rights, literary theory, religion, and to speak of South Africa. In 1999, 
both Tanner Lectures were published into a special volume introduced by political 
philosopher Amy Gutmann and complemented with responses by four scholars. These 
responses showcase the different disciplines that have been concerned with the situation 
of nonhuman animals. Marjorie Garber represents literary criticism, Peter Singer, 
philosophy, Wendy Doniger, religious studies, and Barbara Smuts, primatology. 
These works were delivered and published when the field of Critical Animal 
Studies was coming to the fore in discussions across disciplines inside the university. 
Following the first calls to action from the Animal Rights movements of the late 70s, and 
building on the publication of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975), the debate on the 
ethical status of animals has increased exponentially, reaching a wide audience. Different 
groups have appeared to demand the rights of animals in various degrees-from the 
terrorist organization Animal Liberation Front, to the outspoken PET A, to the local 
Humane Societies. Meanwhile, in the academy, the debate has escalated to discuss the 
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various implications of the uses of nonhuman animal experimentation in the sciences, 
their employment in entertainment, the problems of a factory farming system, as well as 
delving into solutions to the these inquiries. The table of contents of the Association for 
the Study of Literature & Environment (ASLE)'s last issue of their ISLE Journal is an 
example of how interdisciplinary this field can be. Publications range across medical 
research, art criticism, architecture, and cultural studies. 
Cary Wolfe explains the ramifications of Animal Studies in the current setting in 
What is Posthumanism? (2010). For him, Animal Studies, which began with "a 
smattering of work in various fields on human-animal relations and their representation in 
various endeavors," has developed from the paradigm of Animal Rights into a field that 
"is now eager to move beyond that paradigm" (99, 102). The early philosophical 
statements of this field-represented most prominently by Peter Singer's aforementioned 
work and Tom Regan's A Case for Animal Rights (l983)-sought to grant to nonhuman 
animals rights based on concepts of rights and ethics that were ultimately grounded in 
humanistic values that maintained the status of human as superior to animals. These 
humanistic values were in essence anthropocentric, holding the human as the center of 
knowledge. As Wolfe explains, the humanistic subject "is achieved by escaping or 
repressing not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but 
more generally by transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether" 
(xv). In his first book on the subject, Animal Rites (2003), he criticizes this form of 
animal studies because it "takes for granted and reproduces a rather traditional version of 
what I will call the discourse of species-a discourse that, in turn, reproduces the 
institution of speciesism" (2). Developing on what he says is often referred to as the 
"linguistic turn" (Posthumanism 73) of the twentieth century-most predominately with 
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Foucault's criticism of the Human Sciences as institutions of discourse and Derrida' s 
deconstruction of "the relationship between philosophy and language" (Posthumanism 
73)-Wolfe argues for a change in the way we understand Animal Studies. He seeks to 
dismantle the system of humanism that supports the discourse of species and to move 
toward a posthumanist paradigm that recognizes the shortcomings of our discourse and 
our language. This form of Animal Studies would, for him, "reveal[] 'us' to be very 
different creatures from who we thought 'we' were" (Rites 17). 
Cary Wolfe's description of the field of Animal Studies contradicts and criticizes 
the work of most radical Animal Rights supporters, and the debates within this field are 
ongoing. Carrie Rohman, who expands on Cary Wolfe's work, argues in Stalking the 
Subject (2009) that the debate regarding species discourse finds an "anecdotal resistance 
of certain philosophy scholars to interrogate their species assumptions" (161). For her, 
many scholars in various fields do not welcome the questioning of the humanistic basis of 
scholarship. 
Even though philosophy has been groundbreaking in initiating conversations 
about the implications of human and nonhuman relations, the debate on nonhuman 
animals within the academy has been very contentious. Coetzee, with his character of 
Elizabeth Costello, enters this conversation and illustrates the importance of literature in 
casting light on disciplinary knowledge. Through his character, he portrays a series of 
discourses-represented by characters within the academy-and puts them in 
perspective. He makes us aware that these discourses are what Michel Foucault called 
"apparatuses": a form of discourse that produces and maintains knowledge and power. 
Giorgio Agambem, in "What is an Apparatus?" reads Foucault's concept of 
"apparatus" and traces how, when constituting itself as a locus of power, it becomes a 
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sacred form of discourse. Agamben makes it clear that this term inherited qualities from 
Hegel's concept of "positivity," or, as Agamben describes, "the historical element-
loaded as it is with rules, rites, and institutions that are imposed on the individual by an 
external power" (5-6). What Foucault extends in this concept is that it becomes a 
relationship between the subject and this "historical element," a relationship that 
determines the power structures of discourses. In scholarly and scientific disciplines, the 
relationship between the subjects and the history of a discipline-its terms of art, formats, 
formalities, and protocols-dictate the dynamics of power within that discipline. 
Agamben then suggests that we need "to profane" the apparatuses in place, to 
bring them down from their sacred position and restore them to the common use. I want 
to suggest that Coetzee, through Costello, is profaning the apparatuses of disciplines that 
talk about nonhuman animals, namely, Philosophy and Science. In the process of 
profanation, Coetzee forces us to think about the specifics of each discipline and how it 
constructs its knowledge about nonhuman animals. 
This process, however, is not an attempt to do away with disciplines or 
disciplinary knowledge; rather, it is an attempt to make us think about the specifics of 
each discipline, its strengths and its limitations. Cary Wolfe focuses on the importance of 
disciplinary knowledge in constituting the "field" of animal studies. As he states, 
"disciplinary differentiation ( or 'specialization') is not something to be lamented, 
avoided, or overcome; rather 'universalization can be achieved only through 
specification" (114). The field of animal studies does not have a super-theory; it is a place 
where different disciplines can come into contact. As Wolfe says, "we should not try to 
imagine a super-interdiscipline called 'animal studies' ... but rather recognize that it is 
only through our disciplinary specificity that we have something specific and 
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irreplaceable to contribute to this 'question of the animal'" (115). When Coetzee 
performs the "profanation of apparatuses," he is urging us not to abandon disciplinary 
thought/methodologies-which, as Wolfe argues, are the means to speaking specifically 
about nonhuman others-but to rethink how those disciplines, in their specificity, 
theorize about nonhuman animals. 
What I want to argue is that the process through which Coetzee performs this 
profanation is metafiction: a discourse that is constantly aware of its status as discourse. 
By frequently making references to the process of production of his text, Coetzee makes 
his reader aware of the relative status of his discourse, and, thus, by extension, of the 
relative status of the discourses of philosophy and science as well. One can come to the 
conclusion that philosophy and science are constructed discourses that portray not the 
absolute truth, but a specific point of view. 
The very first work in which Elizabeth Costello appears as a main character, "On 
Realism," sets up the metafictional frame of the text. It portrays Elizabeth Costello giving 
a lecture and a series of interviews about realism. The narrator, however, interspaces the 
narrative thread by adding commentary on how the narration is set up, why certain facts 
were chosen and certain parts were skipped. This device works as a commentary on the 
nature of representation. 
Metafiction is defined by Patricia Waugh as "fictional writing which self-
consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artifact in order to pose 
questions about the relationship between fiction and reality" (Meta fiction 2). The very 
first paragraph of "On Realism" presents the reader with the most intriguing question 
about realism: how can language represent reality? As the narrator ponders, "[t]here is 
first of all the problem of the opening, namely, how to get us from where we are, which 
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is, as yet, nowhere, to the far bank" (1). How can the storyteller take the reader to the 
other bank of the river, to the world of ideas, where the story happens? He then 
comments that it "is a simple bridging problem, a problem of knocking together a bridge" 
(1). 
As the story progresses, the narrator obsessively reminds the reader of the 
fictional nature of this text. Every time there's a chronological gap, the narrator notes it: 
"We skip" (2, 3, 7, 16). In certain instances, the narrator breaks with the narrative thread 
to provide more extensive comments on how storytelling works: "storytelling works by 
lulling the reader or listener into a dreamlike state in which the time and space of the real 
world fade away, superseded by the time and space of the fiction" (16). This takes the 
metafictional aspect of the text to another level: not only is the narrator recognizing that 
the story is fictional, but also that all texts, in facing the problem of representation, are 
fictional in some level. All texts have to cross the bridge. 
Understanding the text as a metafiction brings with it political implications. In 
Poetics of Postmodernism (1989), Linda Hutcheon develops the consequences of such a 
self-conscious fiction in writing (and rewriting) official history. For her, to write history 
through metafiction (what she calls historiographic meta fictions) is "to open [the past] up 
to the present, to prevent it from being conclusive and teleological" (110). Even though 
Coetzee is not rewriting history per se, the implications of his metafiction are very 
similar: it prevents the debate on the status of nonhuman animals from being conclusive. 
More importantly, it moves the discussion from a field of inquiry concerned with a 
generalizing truth to one that "asserts that there are only truths in the plural" (Hutcheon, 
109). One that understands the specificity of each discipline and speaks from that locus, 
understanding its implications. 
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When Coetzee is using his fiction to enter a debate on the status of nonhuman 
animals in philosophy and science, he is making us aware of the partial truths that these 
disciplines are telling. Thus, as Hutcheon speaks of postmodern metafiction, it "does not 
destroy their 'truth' value, but it does define the conditions of that 'truth'" (13). It 
elucidates the context of production of its facts. More than that, it also puts each 
argument into perspective. 
In the series of lessons that portray Elizabeth Costello, the representation of her 
lectures in the form of metafiction provides us not only with specific arguments about 
animal rights-and, depending on the story, about a wide range of topics such as literary 
theory, religion, racism, etc.-but also with a set of responses, situations, and other 
characters that contextualize her argument as grounded and relativize. In that sense, her 
work accepts its relative value. Hutcheon suggests that this move is a quality of 
postmodern metafiction that "call[s] attention to both what is being contested and what is 
being offered as a critical response to that, and to do so in a self-aware way that admits its 
own provisionality" (13). Members of Costello's audience contest the arguments that she 
presents in her lectures within Coetzee's fiction. However, these are fictional characters. 
Thus, both Costello's argument and the responses are understood as provisional: they are 
seen as points of view loaded with the disciplinary baggage of each speaker. 
This self-referential ability of Coetzee' s fiction is what makes his work into 
postmodern. As Hutcheon explains, this postmodern fiction "foreground[s] the way we 
talk and write within certain social, historical, and institutional (and thus political and 
economic) frameworks" (184). It questions the established values of philosophy and 
science in a move to understand that "[a]ll of these theories are shown to be human 
constructs which can be made to operate in the interests of political power as well as 
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'disinterested' knowledge: they are all-potentially-discourses of manipulation" (184). 
It helps us understand that these discourses produced by philosophy and, especially, by 
science have implications in the power relations between humans and nonhumans-not 
to mention between humans and other humans. 
Thus, in reading Coetzee's fiction, we come to recognize what Hutcheon defines 
as a "need to examine critically the social and ideological implications operative in the 
institutions of our disciplines-historical, literary, philosophical, linguistic, and so on" 
(184). Coetzee incorporates in his fiction the discourses of philosophy and different 
sciences to put them in perspective and understand them as relative arguments from a 
specific locus. 
In this thesis, I will look at the specifics of Coetzee's work on Elizabeth Costello 
and understand how he uses a metafictional discourse to profane the discourses of 
philosophy and science. In doing so, I hope to understand how each discipline establishes 
its credibility and to verify the literary devices Coetzee uses to rethink that discipline. 
In the first chapter, I will look at Coetzee's argument about the nature of 
philosophical inquiry into the relationships between human and nonhuman animals. In 
the first responses to Lives of Animals --especially in Peter Singer's-there was a 
suggestion that Coetzee was using his fiction to speak about animal rights without taking 
responsibility for his arguments. Philosophers Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell 
responded to these pieces investigating the implications of Coetzee's fiction to talk about 
the rhetoric of animal rights. Diamond analyzes Costello's breakdown at the end of the 
lectures as her facing what Diamond calls "the difficulty of reality": something that is so 
painful that escapes our thinking it. Cavell explains that this difficulty of reality stems 
from a disappointment with language in expressing such pain. Thus, philosophy 
9 
encounters a difficulty: any rationalization of the issue at hand becomes a deflection of 
the issue itself. Both Diamond and Cavell interpret the responses to Lives of Animals as 
forms of deflection of what is being done to nonhuman animals. 
What I want to argue is that Coetzee, in constructing a metafiction, in profaning 
these responses, exposes them as deflections. His Costello suggests that a possible 
alternative to thinking about this subject through the lens of reason is to explore what she 
calls "sympathetic imagination," or the ability to use fiction to imagine the possible 
feelings and thoughts of other minds without engaging in a deflection. Thus, Coetzee's 
metafiction works as a sympathetic imagination that gives us a glimpse into the mind of a 
woman who is wounded by the knowledge of what is being done to animals in our 
current food industry. 
In the second chapter, I will look closely at the dinner scene described at the 
beginning of this introduction and its importance for the profanation of the discourses of 
science on nonhuman subjects. Philosopher of science, Bruno Latour, has written 
extensively on the nature of scientific language in constructing the facts it studies. For 
him, there is a great gap between the sciences and the humanities. While the former is 
focused on using a language devoid of all subjectivity, the latter looks for works that 
privilege subjectivity uninfluenced by technology. He then proposes the field of "science 
studies" to rethink this gap and attempt to promote a more interconnected academia based 
on the proposition that a better understanding between disciplines would promote a better 
understanding of the world. In order to improve the connections between disciplines, 
however, science needs to rethink its processes of meaning making and understand that 
the scientific fact does not represent the ultimate objective truth, but rather a set of 
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interpretations resulting from the relations of the scientist, its object of study, and the 
context within which the work is being done. 
Coetzee's work here works to make us aware of the process of interpretation that 
science uses to research nonhuman animals. During dinner, Elizabeth Costello discusses 
with a psychologist, a political scientist, and an anthropologist about the use of animal in 
our culture. Costello answers each affirmation by a scientist with a question and shifts the 
focus of each scientific analysis to consider other aspects of the research-bringing to the 
fore ethical issues and animal abuse. In this conversation, Costello also makes us aware 
of how each discipline uses a specific language to construct their facts. While science 
attempts to produce objective interpretations of facts and tries to mask the subjectivity 
inherent in that interpretative act, Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello works to make us aware 
that every scientific fact is an interpretation permeated with subjectivity. 
Coetzee's overall work ends in a sour note, as Elizabeth Costello leaves. Neither 
her conversation with the dinner guests after her first visit nor her Q&A with Thomas 
O'Hearne, the professor of philosophy, yield fruitful conclusions. They both finish in 
disagreement and a subtle hostility. The disconnection represents a difficulty with the 
communication between disciplines, a problem that Cary Wolfe analyzes as being the 
result of a humanistic academia. While we hold the humanistic notion of the subject as 
being the center of disciplines, there is no possibility for communication. Wolfe finally 





Coetzee's use of Elizabeth Costello at the Tanner Lectures at Princeton in 1997 
featured a wide range of comments on different disciplines. However, Philosophy is 
presented most prominently and invoked more than other fields in the lectures that 
Costello is represented as delivering; particularly, the relationship philosophy has held 
with literature since Plato banished poetry from the Republic. The very titles of both 
pieces, "Philosophers and the Animals" and "The Poet and the Animals," explicitly target 
this division between philosophy and literature. The set of responses that ensued from 
scholars in various fields about this issue of the Tanner Lectures also addressed primarily 
Costello's approach to Philosophy. 
In addressing an audience of philosophers, and writing a story about a writer 
speaking about philosophy and animal rights, Coetzee is using metafiction to perform a 
profanation of philosophical apparatuses by problematizing the discourse of philosophy 
and placing it vis-a-vis poetry. He is exposing that even the philosophical discourse is, to 
some level, fictional. He is also suggesting that, since philosophy and fiction, on the level 
of discourse, have the same basis-narrative-,fiction can be used to construct 
philosophical arguments that might be more complex than syllogistic arguments. 
Ever since his presentation of the Tanner Lectures, Coetzee' s work has sparked 
various responses. In 1999, in the republished version of The Lives of Animals, utilitarian 
philosopher Peter Singer, and literature professor Marjorie Garber addressed specifically 
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the division between philosophy and literature that Coetzee seeks to subvert. The 
first essay, by Marjorie Garber focuses on the literary aspects of Coetzee' s metafiction 
and places it within the genre of the academic novel, highlighting its similarities and 
differences. The second essay, by philosopher and animal rights activist Peter Singer, is a 
commentary on the divisions of fiction and truth and the problematics of a philosophy of 
animal rights when faced with the radical position of Costello. Thus, these essays provide 
us with an interpretation of Coetzee's work and an intriguing view of how the discipline 
of philosophy is seen by these key figures both outside and inside the discipline. 
Marjorie Garber, in her response, raises various questions about Costello's 
lectures and the implications they have for how we see the academic world. She 
categorizes Lives of Animals as a form of "academic novel" (76) and reinterprets 
references Coetzee makes to current literary scholars. Her most interesting point, 
however, is characterizing Coetzee's lecture within a lecture as a form of metafiction. For 
her, the process of creating a text "that embodies and builds itself around a hall of 
mirrors, a mise en abfme" (76), is a process of writing about writing: a metafiction. More 
than that, this metafiction has the possibility of "insulat[ing] the warring 'ideas' (about 
animal rights, about consciousness, about death, about the family, about academia) 
against claims of authorship and authority" (79). In this view, ideas about the relationship 
between human and nonhuman others becomes secondary; the main focus of the novel, 
for Garber, is fiction itself. As she concludes, "In these two elegant lectures we thought 
John Coetzee was talking about animals. Could it be, however, that all along he was 
really asking, 'What is the value of literature?'" (84). Garber is right to understand 
Coetzee's fiction as a metafiction that is constantly alluding to the act of writing. 
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However, this metafiction does not let go of the relations between human and nonhuman 
others. It asks the value of literature but only as it relates to philosophy and nonhuman 
animals. 
Unlike Garber, Peter Singer has a much more critical response to Coetzee's work. 
His response, in the form of fiction, starts from the assumption that Coetzee, in using 
Elizabeth Costello, is finding a way to project his own opinion about animal rights 
without facing the responsibilities of speaking with his own voice. He creates a fictional 
tale to discuss the philosophy of animal rights. However, unlike Coetzee's, Singer's main 
character bears his own name and shares his widely published and well-known 
philosophical and political positions. Singer concludes his story with the main character, 
Peter, blatantly using fiction to avoid responsibilities for his arguments. 
Thus, Singer becomes an example of the common philosophical understanding of 
philosophy that distinguishes it from literature. He addresses the problematization of truth 
and fiction in Coetzee's writing and responds using the same "literary" structure. In his 
story, the philosopher Peter is weeks away from going to Princeton and responding to 
Coetzee's Tanner lecture. As he ponders how to respond, he engages in a conversation 
with his daughter and he both mocks the main line of argument in Coetzee's fiction and 
uses it to clarify his own philosophical positions. 
Singer's analysis of Coetzee' s use of Costello is clearly critical, even disdainful. 
At the beginning of the conversation, Peter's daughter interprets Coetzee' s fiction in an 
analysis that is extremely reductionist: "Tres post-modern . .. You know, Baudrillard, 
and all that stuff about simulation, breaking down the distinction between reality and 
representation, and so on? And look at the opportunities of playing with self-reference!" 
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(85). Her interpretation is critical of postmodern as a popular tendency that disregards 
engagement with political change. 
Later, Peter attempts to explain his own philosophical arguments-ones that 
Costello criticizes to some extent. He clarifies his division between human and 
nonhuman animals and then explains that humans are indeed superior. As he tells his 
daughter, "normal humans have capacities that far exceed those of nonhuman animals, 
and some of these capacities are morally significant in particular contexts" (87). As he 
compares his daughter to his dog, Max, "Naomi was always chattering about what she 
was going to be when she grew up. I'm sure that you don't think about what you will be 
doing next summer, or even next week" (87). His daughter has the capacity to reason 
about the future, while Max does not possess that ability. Singer is committed to a notion 
of humanity based on the capacity to reason. 
At the end, when confronted with the question of how to respond to Coetzee's 
lecture, he and his daughter discuss the benefits of using fiction: for him it is a form that 
allows one to "blithely criticize the use of reason, without ... really committing ... to 
these claims" (91). Finally, when Singer's philosopher, Peter, contemplates writing a 
fictional text, he ironically asks, "When have I ever written fiction?" (91). The irony 
present in this last sentence implies that Peter Singer, the philosopher, is using Peter, the 
character, to do precisely what he interprets Coetzee as doing. In other words, Singer is 
using his fiction to create a discourse that he thinks is free from responsibilities. 
The problem with Singer's position is that it misses the main point in Coetzee's 
argument: that fiction, through putting an argument into perspective, is not evading 
responsibilities for it, but instead anticipating and acknowledging the possible responses 
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and shortcomings of the argument. Singer's response makes it evident that he 
understands philosophy and literature as separate discourses, the former superior to the 
latter. It is this hierarchical separation that Coetzee criticizes. For Singer, the discourse of 
pure philosophy-avoiding the use of fiction--can speak about nonhuman animals and 
take a responsibility more effectively. 
In a 2003 conference in honor of Stanley Cavell, philosopher Cora Diamond 
responded to Coetzee's work and to the reflections in The Lives of Animals. Five years 
later, Stanley Cavell himself extended on Diamond's argument, creating a conversation 
about nonhuman animals, philosophy, and literature. Both philosophers disagreed with 
Singer in maintaining that Coetzee's fiction should not be taken at face value, but 
understood as a comment on the very nature of philosophical language and its 
shortcomings. 
Cora Diamond, in her "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of 
Philosophy," acknowledges that Coetzee, through Costello, goes to the heart of an old 
debate-one that stems from the beginnings of Greek philosophy-on the very positions 
of philosophical inquiry versus poetry. Stephen Mulhall, in The Wounded Animal (2009), 
summarizes Diamond's position in this debate as an attempt to: 
point out that there are other forms of critical reflection as well-ones with which 
we are perhaps more familiar in extraphilosophical contexts, but which are no less 
concerned to deepen our understanding and enrich our thought by embodying 
certain kinds of affective response to things, and inviting us to share those 
responses, as well as to critically evaluate them. (9) 
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Diamond's analysis of Elizabeth Costello develops the dilemmas involved in 
ethical interactions between human and nonhuman animals and the problems of 
philosophy when faced with using a purely logical or reasonable philosophical discourse 
to talk about animals and ethics. She ultimately suggests that the language of reason that 
is commonly used by philosophy might not be sufficient to discuss the ethics of 
nonhuman animal abuse. 
She uses John Updike's term "difficulty of reality" to explain a situation in which 
the mind encounters something that it cannot properly process (44). This would be 
something in reality that resists our thinking or is "painful in its inexplicability, difficult 
in that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability" (46). Elizabeth 
Costello is the embodiment of this difficulty as she suffers from the knowledge that 
animals are suffering. She embodies what Diamond calls the "wounded animal" that is 
haunted by the knowledge of what happens to some animals and by "how unhaunted 
others are"(46). As Costello asks herself at the end of the lectures, "this is life. Everyone 
comes to terms with it, why can't you? Why can 'f you?" (69). But she cannot escape her 
wounded self, her knowledge of animal abuse. 
Diamond then suggests that the responses in Lives of Animals--especially 
Singer's-ignore this difficulty of reality and engage in a philosophical discussion of 
animal abuse with a skeptical language that deflects reality. She uses Cavell's term, 
"deflection," to describe this form of philosophy and points out that the problem is that 
"The deflection into discussion of a moral issue is a deflection which makes our own 
bodies mere facts" (59). It deflects the difficulty of reality and uses a language of reason 
to abstract the abuse to nonhuman others. 
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Stanley Cavell's response, "Companionable Thinking" (2008), extends Cora 
Diamond's analyses of Elizabeth Costello. He starts his argument by tracing a difference 
between the knowledge that haunts Costello, which he calls "inordinate knowledge" and 
"the mere or unobtrusive or intellectualized or indifferent or stored knowledge" (95) of 
philosophy. While Costello feels the pain of not being able to cope with the reality that 
haunts her, philosophy is unable to talk about such reality without deflecting it into the 
language of intellectualized knowledge. 
Thus, he explains that this is the difficulty of philosophy: trying to work through 
an issue but encountering a problem of language and not being able to represent this issue 
without deflecting it. As he says, philosophy has "a chronic difficulty in expressing 
oneself, especially in its manifestation as finding a difficulty or disappointment with 
meaning, or say with language, or with human expression, as such" (10 1). It becomes 
difficult to understand or accept the reality of animal abuse because of the impossibility 
to find a language that can represent it. 
Cary Wolfe, in Critical Environments (1998), characterizes Cavell's philosophical 
method as a form of pragmatism. For him, this pragmatism is unique in how it keeps 
alive the "problem of philosophical skepticism" (2). Unlike other pragmatists who take a 
stance of antitheory, Cavell is still attempting to "combine the desire for the 'outside' of 
theory and philosophy ... with a commitment to antifoundationalism and contingency, to 
philosophy, in Cavell's words, as a task of 'onwardness,' 'transience,' and 
'homelessness,' to thinking as 'finding' rather than 'founding' of foundational 
philosophy" (2). Cavell believes in the development of philosophy and theory while 
remaining committed to the politics of the Other. and avoiding foundationalism. For the 
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politics of the relationship between human and nonhuman animals, Cavell's pragmatism 
is helpful as it offers a form of philosophical discourse that does not lose sight of its 
practical implications in daily lives. 
Cavell's philosophical position, however, does not offer a solution for the 
problem of philosophy. It leaves no room for different forms of thought that fall outside 
the humanistic values of Enlightenment subjectivity. Ultimately, we are left with what 
McDowell concludes in his "Comment on 'Companionable Thinking"': that "philosophy 
in the academic mode, in Cavell's own reading, avoids what is really at issue in its 
engagements with skepticism" (138). 
In Coetzee's narrative, there is a division between Costello, who is faced with the 
problem of reality of animal abuse, and her son and daughter-in-law, who avoid thinking 
of that problem. Instead of speaking of her own fiction, which would certainly please the 
audience, Costello decides to speak of animals. This evokes reactions in both John and 
Norma who, even before her lecture, regard her arguments as too radical. John prefers not 
to be associated with his mother and takes the opportunity of anonymity provided by their 
differing last names. Norma, a Ph.D. in philosophy from Johns Hopkins, anticipates that 
the lecture will be an embarrassment. For her, Costello's works are "overrated, ... her 
opinions on animals, animal consciousness and ethical relations with animals are jejune 
and sentimental" (17). In the small narrative that preludes the lecture, we are already 
presented with the main theoretical tension within the work: Costello's facing the 
problem of reality and unable to process how others are not wounded by this problem. 
Later, during her lecture, we are presented with yet another demonstration of the 
problem of philosophy: Costello attempts to criticize reason as a test of superiority 
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among species but is unable to detach completely from that language. She traces her 
philosophical tradition; she employs "the language of Aristotle and Porphyry, of 
Augustine and Aquinas, of Descartes and Bentham, of, in our day, Mary Midgley and 
Tom Reagan" (22). In this move, she places herself in a specific philosophical tradition 
that uses logic and reason as a common ground for debate-only to later criticize it. As 
she states, "that is my dilemma this afternoon. Both reason and seven decades of life 
experience tell me that reason is neither the being of the universe nor the being of God" 
(23). She attempts to use reason to criticize reason itself, and then delves into the 
shortcomings of this as a mode of judgment for species superiority. Through these first 
remarks, as well as the interactions with her son and daughter-in-law, we can notice the 
tensions between the language of philosophy based on reason and its problems in 
addressing such an issue as animal abuse. 
Cora Diamond, on the other hand, points out that Costello tries to think through 
this problem with what she suggests as the "sympathetic imagination" (35): a capacity to 
imagine the lives of others and attempt to understand them. For Diamond, this means that 
the fictional character "sees poetry, rather than philosophy, as having a capacity to return 
us to such a sense of what animal life is" (53). Only through this imagination-or 
literature-we can have a better understanding of what animals experience. Coetzee 
offers a text that explores the insufficiency of philosophical knowledge when faced with 
inordinate knowledge or the problem of reality. 
In place of the language of reason, Costello offers a language of feeling and 
pathos. As she explains, "The heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to 
share at times the being of another. ... There are people who have the capacity to 
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imagine themselves as someone else" (34-35). She uses feelings and imagination to 
appeal to her audience's pathos and convince them of the possibilities of understanding 
animal thought. Dominic Head, in The Cambridge Introduction to 1. M. Coetzee (2009), 
recognizes the appeal of Costello's speech to sympathy and her concept of "sympathetic 
imagination" as a means to understand the positions of animals and their suffering. Head 
points out that Coetzee's fiction "encourag[es] us to allow sympathy to weigh more 
heavily in the balance" (82). This is one kind of method that breaks with philosophical 
skepticism and promotes another form of critical reflection. 
Through Costello, Coetzee argues for the use of fiction as an alternative to 
thinking rationally about the relationship between human and nonhuman others. In 
Costello's lecture, the language of rationality-of ordinate knowledge-prevents one 
from acknowledging the position of others. Here, she brings back the allusion to death 
camps: "The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their 
victims, as did everyone else" (79). She then argues that it is only through "sympathy" 
that someone can relate to the situation of others. As she wonders about the killers in the 
death camps, "They did not say, 'How would it be if I were burning?' They did not say, 
'I am burning, I am falling in ash'" (79). In these two statements, she starts by pointing 
out that Nazi guards did not wonder what it would be like to be someone else. Her first 
sentence uses the participle "would" followed by the conditional "if," marking a removed 
statement. She then revises her sentence, repeating the introduction "They did not say," 
but, instead, using the present tense: "I am burning." The use of present tense instead of a 
conditional past participle marks a discourse of fiction. While in the first sentence the 
killers would only wonder, in the second statement, the killers would be fully taking the 
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place of their victims and considering the situation as it happens. Thus, in describing the 
process of sympathetic imagination, she moves from a distanced position (" ... would it 
be if 1 were burning") to the imagined center ("I am burning, 1 am falling in ash"). 
Nevertheless, Costello's sympathetic imagination is not offered as the ultimate 
solution to the limits of philosophy. After her second lecture, the uncomfortable 
situations that arise from Costello's debate with philosopher Thomas O'Hearne show the 
failure of such endeavor. As her son drives her to the airport, she breaks down, "I no 
longer know where I am" (69). Everywhere she looks, she sees the "evidences" of animal 
abuse. Dominic Head concludes that The Lives of Animals "promote[s] the sympathetic 
capacity while simultaneously exposing its intellectual flaws" (83). These flaws would be 
the suffering that can come from facing the problem of reality. Costello is still wounded 
at the end of her lectures; she suffers even more by sympathetically relating to animal 
abuse. Hence, the lectures appeal to sympathy-use it as a means to understanding the 
suffering of others-but Coetzee also problematizes the results of sympathy. Through the 
sympathetic imagination, Costello can position herself as a locus of suffering. However, 
she ultimately does question the very discourse of philosophy and reason that attempt to 
carry the responsibility of theorizing about nonhuman animals. 
Despite the problems with sympathetic imagination, Coetzee's metafiction can 
provide the reader with a more encompassing set of voices. After the first lecture is over, 
we are presented with arguments that contradict Costello. Before going to the dinner 
table, she is asked a question by an older gentleman in the audience who is eager to know 
the practicality of her speech. As he asks, "are you saying we should close down the 
factory farms? Are you saying we should stop eating meat?" (36), he questions the actual 
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implications of her discourse. He demands clarity, "what wasn't clear to me is what you 
were actually targeting" (36). He represents the common response to the discussion on 
animal studies: what is the practical use of these musings? To think of animals, Costello's 
questioner would claim, is not solely to engage in theoretical debates, but to extrapolate 
to everyday situations. However, Costello's response is far from satisfactory. She 
answers, "I was hoping not to have to enunciate principles" (37). She is aware that 
enunciating principles would partake on the discourse of reason she is trying to criticize. 
Just as metafiction is self-aware fiction, Costello works as the embodiment of a 
philosophy that is self-aware. After the first lecture is over and the guests have moved on 
to dinner, the narrator asks: "So are they, out of deference to vegetarianism, going to 
serve nut rissoles to everyone?" (38). Later, Costello responds to the president of the 
university's compliment about her vegetarianism-"'I have a great respect for it,' says 
Garrard. 'As a way of life'" (43). She resists his praise, describing herself as embodying 
the very complications and contradictions of the text's multiple discourses, ''I'm wearing 
leather shoes, ... I'm carrying a leather purse. I wouldn't have overmuch respect if I 
were you" (43). Most animal rights advocacy is predicated on a notion that an activist 
approach, be it vegetarianism or eating local, can be the optimal solution to animal 
problems and, thus, leave one with a clean conscience. Costello here eschews such a 
position and creates an approach that recognizes its own faults. This works to relativize 
the concept of animal abuse. It accepts that the situation is not as black and white as some 
animal rights activist make it out to be. 
Costello's attempt to take a position in the topic of animal abuse, however, only 
brings more hostility toward her. During the second lecture, "The Poet and the Animals," 
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Costello participates in a conversation with literature students. After her speech, there is a 
formal session of question and answer with professor of philosophy, Thomas O'Hearne. 
His inquiries into the logics of animal rights involve outright attacks on Costello's 
philosophy and posit very antagonistic points to her earlier claims. As he states, "it is 
because agitation for animal rights, including the right to life, is so abstract that I find it 
unconvincing and, finally, idle" (110). To which she responds with the same level of 
hostility: "Anyone who says that life matters less to animals than it does to us has not 
held in his hands an animal fighting for its life" (110). Although their debate is not 
disrespectful, they end on a sour note. Her son John notices, "that is the note on which 
Dean Arendt has to bring the proceedings to a close: acrimony, hostility, bitterness" (67). 
And still, John blames his mother's unorthodox views for it, "John Bernard is sure that is 
not what Arendt or his committee wanted. Well, they should have asked him before they 
invited his mother. He could have known" (67). In her final formal lecture, Costello is 
still perceived as being unreasonable and radical. After discussing the situation with his 
wife at night, John comes to the sad conclusion, "A few hours and she'll be gone, then we 
can return to normal" (68). This scene depicts a situation often common in the 
discussions regarding animal rights or the question of the animal in our lives: the 
difficulty of speaking about animals without shaking the foundations of the normal. 
Conversations about the conditions of animals in our culture usually unsettle most 
people. It is a delicate topic that causes embarrassment and uncomfortable situations. 
Coetzee embodies the unsettling nature of this issue in the figure of Costello herself: a 
sometimes-inconvenient character who triggers feelings of rage and disgust in people. 
Her response to president Garrard's queries about her vegetarianism is only met with 
24 
respect by the president because of the formalities that protect an invited lecturer. Her 
responses to other professors at dinner are not met with the same respect. Abraham Stern, 
infuriated by her comparison of factory farming to the Holocaust, refuses to dine with 
her. Her own daughter-in-law refuses to take her to the airport in the morning. Her son 
longs for her departure. Like the disturbing conversations surrounding the relations 
between human and nonhuman animals, the discomfiting Costello is not likable. Coetzee 
puts forth the discourse of vegetarianism and animal liberation, but also represents the 
possible responses to such discourse. 
In the act of incorporating different voices into his Tanner Lectures, Coetzee 
creates a metafictional, multi-voiced text that incorporates various disciplinary discourses 
to problematize, destabilize, and subvert the traditional divide between literature and 
philosophy. By inverting the privileged position of the philosophical inquiry over fiction, 
and especially by using fiction-or the sympathetic imagination-to delve into the 
conversations within philosophy, he is able to create a work that prevents the discourse 
on animals from becoming conclusive. Through Costello, we are able to constantly think 





In the first part of his Tanner lectures, The Lives of Animals, Coetzee portrays a 
scene in which different professors from various disciplines are discussing Elizabeth 
Costello's address. After the controversial lecture, Costello accompanies her son and 
other professors of Appleton College to a dinner, where they sit, eat, and discuss the 
status of nonhuman animals. This scene-described at the opening of this thesis-puts 
the academic discourses on the relationship between human and nonhuman animals into 
conversation. While the discussions range from psychology to philosophy and religion, it 
works as a commentary on the connection between disciplines within the university and, 
especially, makes us aware of the role of science when working on nonhuman others. 
When the lectures were republished in the special edition with responses from 
leading scholars, we could see that very scene acted out. Just as several professors 
respond and question Costello, Coetzee receives commentaries on his text. In this 
chapter, I will argue that, in this scene, just as with philosophy, Coetzee's metafiction 
works as a statement on the nature of scientific discourse relating to nonhuman animals 
and its place within the university. When reading the responses of psychologist Ruth 
Orkin to Costello within the narrative in parallel with Barbara Smuts' response to 
Coetzee outside the novel, we are presented with a striking commentary on the nature of 
scientific discourse and its connections to other discourses within academia. 
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The nature of scientific discourse has been widely discussed. The French 
sociologist of science and anthropologist Bruno Latour has analyzed the relations 
between the sciences and the humanities and conducted extensive research on the 
language employed by science to speak about the nonhuman world. His line of research 
has culminated into what he considers to be the field of "science studies": a way to 
understand the nature of scientific discourse and the relationships it has within its context. 
His Pandora's Hope (1999), in particular, can help us understand the main conflicts that 
Coetzee portrays in Elizabeth Costello. Latour argues that the great divide between 
sciences and humanities in academia is questioned constantly by scientists and other 
scholars that claim a bridge between disciplines is in place, "but when scores of people 
from outside the sciences begin to build just that bridge, they recoil in horror and want to 
impose the strangest of all gags on free speech since Socrates: only scientists should 
speak about science" (17). Many use the authority of scientific apparatus to devalue the 
opinions of other disciplines that attempt to make sense of some scientific argument. 
Moreover, this attitude promotes the opposite reaction: scholars from other fields 
devalue the work that tries to conciliate subjectivity to technological advances. As Latour 
notes, while one camp of the academia argues for the power of pure science free of 
subjectivity, "the other camp, spread out much more widely, deems humanity, morality, 
subjectivity, or rights worthwhile only when they have been protected from any contact 
with science, technology, and objectivity" (18). For him, ideally, a more understanding 
relationship between the sciences and the humanities-for example-could promote a 
better understanding of the world; the more relations each discipline establishes, "the 
more humane a collective" we have (18). 
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Furthermore, Latour identifies how difficult it has become for each discipline to 
stay true to the traditional slogan "the less connected a science the better" (20). As he 
states, "we have many disciplines, uncertain of their exact status, striving to apply the old 
model, unable to reinstate it, and not yet prepared to mutter something like what we have 
been saying all along: Relax, calm down, the more connected a science is the better'" 
(20). As the university develops an interdisciplinary scenario where scholars are urged to 
speak to others from different fields, the traditional division and isolation of each 
discipline comes into scrutiny. Nevertheless, the sciences are still struggling with 
bridging the gap. 
Hence, Latour suggests that the field of science studies should aim at promoting a 
fruitful communication between fields of knowledge. He points out the need for 
translations between fields; for taking the specific scientific fact and setting it vis-a-vis 
the politics involved in its emergence. As he states, "[t]here's a translation of political 
terms into scientific terms and vice versa .... The analysis of these translation operations 
makes up a large portion of science studies" (87). This field would look into how the 
scientific facts are presented within the social and political framework in which they were 
produced. It would analyze the process of translation from the specific field of science 
into the general interdisciplinary environment of the university. 
Latour's concept of translation diverges greatly from the traditional conception of 
translating as the substitution of equivalents in a different language: "[t]he operation of 
translation consists of combining two hitherto different interests ... to form a single 
composite goal" (88). Instead of substituting language units-keywords, phrases, or 
data-he proposes that the translator aggregate perspectives from various fields into what 
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becomes the scientific fact. In other words, translating a scientific fact into another 
discipline does not entail a mere game of substitution, but a complex process of 
contextualization of the fact. 
To better explain how such a process of translation might be successful, Latour 
uses the case of Frederic Joliot, the French physicist who employed his ability to translate 
his science to other scholars to gain access to more resources. While he was developing 
the first atomic reactor in France, his research required extremely large amounts of 
uranium, which was only obtained by allying his scientific findings-on the nature of 
atomic fission-to the future of science in France. Joliot rhetorically coupled his research 
to the political context of France after World War II. As Latour points out, "[t]here are in 
fact moments when, if one holds firmly the calculation of the cross-section of deuterium, 
one also holds, through substitutions and translations, the fate of France, the future of 
industry, the destiny of physics, a patent, a good paper, a Nobel Prize, and so on" (90). 
While in one level Joliot was developing a very specific research in physics, he was also 
involved in the politics of such a research in Europe at the time. 
A scientific fact cannot exist as itself if it is to be understood by other disciplines. 
It needs to be contextualized and translated. This is how Latour considers that we should 
evaluate a fact: 
The quality of a science's reference does not come from some salta 
marta Ie out of discourse and society in order to access things, but depends rather 
on the extent of its transformations, the safety of its connections, the progressive 
accumulation of its mediations, the number of interlocutors it engages, its ability 
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to make nonhumans accessible to words, its capacity to interest and to convince 
others, and its routine institutionalization of these flows. (97) 
Each discipline cannot conceive its facts without relating them to the world and 
recognizing the politics behind its conception. Latour measures the quality of a fact 
especially by its relations with other sciences. 
Latour's focus on the socio-political context of a scientific fact changes the 
importance of language and subjectivity for science. If a discipline can only be successful 
by translating itself, then its use of language needs to be deliberate: not only focusing on 
objectivity but considering its context. The fact cannot speak for itself anymore, but the 
scientist needs to employ it knowingly in a larger context. Thus, scientific language 
ceases to be a transparent vehicle for meaning, and becomes a political practice. 
In this sense, Latour acknowledges Foucault's realization that language constructs 
the scientific fact and, in doing so, defines the discipline in which that fact lies. Cary 
Wolfe, in What is Posthumanism?, builds on this notion and characterizes disciplines as 
"constitut[ing] their objects through their practices, theoretical commitments, and 
methodological procedures" (l08). He draws much on Foucault's idea of discourse and 
Niklas Luhman's notion of communication to conceive that a discipline is defined more 
by the communication it establishes than by its objects or persons. As Wolfe states, "it is 
clear that just as disciplinary formations are not constituted by objects but by 
communications ... neither are they constituted by persons . ... The fundamental 
elements of social systems are not people but communications" (115). People are not the 
discourse of a discipline but take part and contribute to that discourse. An individual can, 
then, be part of this communication system, but only in through discourse. 
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Thus, discourses cannot be interdisciplinary and people can only transition 
between disciplines if they are able to translate between different discourses. As Wolfe 
concludes, "This means we can say that people can participate in interdisciplinarity even 
if disciplines can't, only if we are willing to give up the traditional notion of 'person.' 
Only, that is, if we become posthumanist" (115). For Wolfe, while still associated with 
the traditional notions of humanism, one cannot participate in a communication network 
between disciplines. As Wolfe states, in humanism, the human is the center "in relation to 
either evolutionary, ecological, or technological coordinates" (xvi) and thus works as the 
center of a discipline. Subject and discipline are tied in an inescapable relation. It is only 
by deconstructing the humanist subject, and accepting the fluidity of a posthuman 
subjectivity that we would be able to promote an interconnected academia. 
Consequently, we can say that Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello urges the reader to 
take the posthumanist stance. Through the responses that Costello gives her dinner 
companions, we can see that she eschews the traditional scientific belief that facts can 
speak for themselves. Coetzee thus suggests accepting the subjectivity of each individual 
within each discipline and exploring research that focuses on that approach. 
The conversation between scholars from Appleton College-the predominant 
second half of the first Tanner lecture-begins with a comment from a psychologist, Ruth 
Orkin, about scientific experiments done on a chimpanzee that was reared as human. 
When the scientists asked the chimpanzee to sort some photographs, she placed her 
photos in the same pile as that of humans. Orkin comments on it, "One is tempted to give 
the story a straightforward reading ... namely, that she wanted to be thought of as one of 
us" (84). What starts the longest conversation in the novel is a comment on the nature of 
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interpretation of the scientific fact. Orkin goes on to make a stronger claim about the 
particulars of reading a fact: "Yet as a scientist one has to be cautious" (84). Orkin is 
attached to a tradition of science that pines for objectivity. Her use of the word "tempted" 
to describe the act of reading reveals a notion that interpretation of a fact, subjectively 
giving meaning to a scientific truth, can be considered a religious transgression. For her, 
a scientist needs to be "cautious" not to fall into the "temptations" of interpretation; one 
needs to stick to the facts without interpreting them. 
As a response to this statement, Elizabeth Costello offers another interpretation of 
the same fact and, in doing so, evinces the impossibility of taking the fact at face value, 
without interpretation. As she says, "In her [the chimpanzee's] mind the two piles could 
have a less obvious meaning. Those who are free to come and go versus those who have 
to stay locked up, for instance" (84). Costello starts by focusing on the chimpanzee's 
feelings instead of her reasoning abilities, something that science usually avoids doing. 
This targets the gap between sciences and humanities that Latour describes. Costello even 
builds on the thought of feelings and supposes a will of the chimpanzee to be free, 
invoking the animal rights aspect of the scientific interpretation. Thus, she is urging a 
revision of the scientific fact in view of what Latour describes being ignored by science: 
"morality, subjectivity, or rights" (18). 
Coetzee, in portraying this response by Costello, makes the reader aware of the 
status of both Orkin's and Costello's perspectives as constructed discourses. It is by the 
metafictional move of narrating this after-lecture conversation within the Tanner 
Lectures-and, in doing so, representing the Tanner lectures within the lecture-that he 
calls attention to the constructed nature of these discourses. Ultimately, he suggests that 
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the scientific fact cannot be presented entirely objectively. Even if a scientist is 
"cautious" as Orkin suggests, he/she will still be providing an interpretation from a 
specific point of view-one that may ignore the chimpanzee's subjectivity, or that may 
not note the chimpanzee's will to be free. 
As the conversation continues, the participants move from the topic of psychology 
and chimpanzee ethology to the subject of food and culture; from biological sciences to 
social sciences. Wunderlich, a professor with strong inclinations toward anthropology, 
suggests that the reason why humans are seen differently than other animals and thus 
acceptable as food is because of "cleanness and uncleanness." As he explains, seemingly 
invoking the work of Mary Douglas, "uncleanness can be a very handy device for 
deciding who belongs and who doesn't, who is in and who is out" (85). Costello's son, 
John, who is a physicist and speaks for the first time in the conversation, supports this 
division between animals and humans. He adds the characteristic of "shame" to the 
division, to which Wunderlich complements: "Exactly ... animals don't hide their 
excretions, they perform sex in the open. They have no sense of shame" (85). And 
finally, Wunderlich concludes by tying the notion of "shame" to the religious beliefs that 
underlie some theories of the division between human and nonhuman. As he states, 
"Shame makes human beings of us, shame of uncleanness. Adam and Eve: the founding 
myth. Before that we were all just animals together" (85). He attempts to claim that these 
religious views influence traditional scientific interpretations. 
The commentaries by Wunderlich spark two important responses from the dinner 
guests: Olivia Garrard, the president's wife, and Elizabeth Costello. While the first one 
criticizes Wunderlich for being too abstract, the latter shifts the focus of this conversation 
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to how it evinces the religious beliefs underlying some anthropological discourses. While 
the first seems indignant about his comments, the latter is interested in exploring these 
new possibilities about religion as a basis for these theories. 
Olivia is the first one to interject, "But that can't be how the mechanism works .. 
. . It's too abstract, too much of a bloodless idea. Animals are creatures we don't have sex 
with - that's how we distinguish them from ourselves" (85). Her comments display a 
concern with objective analysis. The use of both "mechanism" to define the situation 
analyzed and "abstract" to qualify Wunderlich's comments show a preoccupation in 
maintaining functional field of study-one that works like a machine-and a desire for 
practicalities-rid of abstractions. She eventually circles her concerns back to 
Wunderlich's original comments that humans and animals just don't mix, refusing to 
accept his abstraction about the genesis of this division being religion. She concludes 
simply, refusing any abstractions about divine suppositions that "we don't mix with them. 
We keep the clean apart from the unclean" (85). She attempts to provide an objective 
anthropological view eschewing the possibility of religion as a legitimizer of 
human/nonhuman divisions. 
Elizabeth Costello, on the other hand, waits for Wunderlich to reply to Olivia's 
comments and, as in her response to psychologist Ruth Orkin, shifts the focus of the 
conversation by attempting to point out how Wunderlich's argument exposes underlying 
assumptions of anthropological discourse. He adds that the Greeks could not accept 
slaughter and thus devised ritualistic sacrifices to legitimize their killings. As he states, 
"Ask for the blessing of the gods on the flesh you are about to eat, ask them to declare it 
clean" (86). To this, Costello responds, "Perhaps that is the origins of the gods," causing 
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another disruption in the conversation. She continues, "Perhaps we invented gods so that 
we could put the blame on them. They gave us permission to eat flesh" (86). Her 
comments support Wunderlich's argument for looking at the underlying assumptions of 
anthropological claims. 
This scene plays within the divide to which Latour constantly calls attention. The 
division between Olivia and Wunderlich when discussing anthropology is a form of 
showing how this very field is divided on the use of subjectivity in its interpretations. 
Ultimately, just like the overall discussions at dinner, these two diverging perspectives 
end on a note of dissent. While they represent the subjects that Cary Wolfe defines as the 
"center of a discipline"-humanist subjects-they cannot communicate. They cannot find 
a common ground. 
While Costello is not necessarily the representation of a posthumanist subject, she 
does show signs of discomfort with a humanistic subjectivity. She avoids definitive 
affirmations. Her response avoids being absolute about what she believes. She starts the 
response by using the word "perhaps" more than once. After her commentaries, a silence 
reigns at the dinner table. The only one to respond directly to her comment is President 
Garrard, who asks, "Is that what you believe?" Costello, however, does not offer a 
conclusive answer to this question. She responds just by saying that inventing a god to 
legitimize eating meet is a convenient belief. She states, "God told us it was OK" (86), 
but refuses to confirm it as a definitive statement she is making. Unlike Orkin, 
Wunderlich, Olivia, or any other character at the table, Costello recognizes the tensions 
of a humanistic subjectivity. 
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This recognition, in turn, does not render her responses popular. Again, Costello 
and her ideas are seen as out of place in this scenario. After her commentaries on the 
existence of God and the legitimization of meat eating, she is the one who has to change 
the subject in face of an unresponsive audience. Through Coetzee's metafiction, it 
becomes clear that Costello's position is not well received within the university. He here 
suggests that the academia is reluctant to accept what Wolfe recognizes as the 
"decentering of the human" (xvi). 
The problems of scientific language and subjectivity take an interesting turn when 
the Tanner lectures are read parallel to the response by anthropologist and psychologist 
Barbara Smuts. Even though she is innovative in using her scientific experiences to 
approach the topic of nonhuman animals, she adheres to the protocols of her disciplines 
and enacts the discourse that Costello is trying to question when talking to Orkin and 
Olivia. Hence, when Smuts' work is read with Coetzee's, the metafictional moves that 
Coetzee performs in his text help us understand the underlying structure of Smuts' 
rhetoric. 
She starts her essay by identifying a gap in Coetzee's lecture: neither Costello nor 
any other characters attempt to prove Thomas Aquinas and Thomas O'Hearne wrong. 
They are not able to portray meaningful friendship between human and nonhuman. She 
finds this gap noteworthy once "we realize that in a story that is, ostensibly, about our 
relations with members of other species, none of the characters ever mentions a personal 
encounter with an animal" (107). Then, based on her personal experience, she describes 
two types of friendship she has had, with baboons in a field expedition to Africa, and 
with her dog, Safi. 
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Over several research trips to different parts of Africa, Smuts was able to spend 
some time in the field observing baboons, among other nonhuman animals. For the time 
she spent with them, she was able to "abandon[] myself to their far superior knowledge" 
and "learn[] from masters about being an African anthropoid" (l09). Slowly, she was 
able to survive in the African jungle by following the baboons and being accepted as one 
of them. She learned about the complex habits of that pack of baboons and their 
idiosyncrasies. She analyzed their social behaviors and compared them to those of 
humans. 
Smuts' response is thought-provoking as it portrays the tension between 
objectivity and subjectivity in scientific research. She begins by classifying her methods 
as the traditional objective ones of science: "most of my activities while 'in the field' 
were designed to gain objective, replicable information about the animals' lives" (109). 
Her gaze as a researcher was not to be as a human disrupting the animals' lives, but as 
one of them, not interfering with their dynamics. Nevertheless, she progresses to see her 
research more personally and subjectively as she interprets that each baboon had a unique 
personality. As she notes, "there were 140 baboons in the troop, and I came to know 
everyone as a highly distinctive individual" (111). Her hands-off research becomes a 
process of learning about her nonhuman companions by engaging with them and relating 
subjectively with each individual. She eventually gave the baboons names such as "Dido" 
or "Lysistrata" (111). 
Nevertheless, Coetzee's and Smuts' texts differ greatly on their stand towards 
humanism. While Coetzee is making a move towards posthumanism and questioning the 
possibility of interdisciplinarity when speaking about nonhuman animals, Smuts is 
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attached to a humanist tradition that holds objectivity and reason as central to science. 
Her position towards the apes with whom she lived does question the binary opposition 
of human versus animal, but still uses the value of reason to qualify them as worthy of 
attention. 
While Coetzee' s Costello feels uneasy with the position of reason in Western 
philosophy, Smuts, similarly to those involved in the Great Ape Project, suggests that we 
look at the possible relationships of friendship one can have with these animals that have 
ability to some level of reasoning. Even her relationship with her dog Safi is also 
predicated on relations of communication that require the animal to be a thinking being. 
In other words, this friendship that Smuts values can only be constituted between certain 
species: the ones that posses an ability to think and reason. While Smuts problematizes 
the relationship between human and nonhuman others in the sciences, she bases her 
argument in a humanistic notion of rights and ethics that reinforce the separation in that 
relationship. 
Smuts' text is also marked by an attempt at objective scientific language. As she 
states about her research, "Doing good science, it turned out, consisted mostly of 
spending every possible moment with the animals, watching them with the utmost 
concentration, and documenting myriad aspects of their behavior" (109). The use of a 
qualifier "good" in describing science and then explaining it as a task of "watching" and 
"documenting" reveals a preference for science that focuses on exposing the facts for 
themselves, without interpretation. 
Bruno Latour notices that scientific research usually attempts to portray 
objectivity by certain uses of language. As he point out, "a convenient marker of the 
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appearance of a scientific fact is that the modifier drops entirely and only the dictum is 
maintained" (93). This is often true of Smuts' verb tenses in her analysis of the baboons. 
She uses sentences such as "Adolescent females concluded formal, grown-up-style 
greetings with somber adult males" or "Grizzled males approached balls of wrestling 
infants and tickled them" (110). In her descriptions of their actions, she states the fact in 
simple past tense and doesn't modulate the verbs: she states the fact in simple past 
instead of using adverbs such as "maybe" or "perhaps," or modals such as "would," or 
"could." Smuts even uses this dictum-oriented language to describe the thoughts of her 
dog Safi: "when playing fetch with a toy, Safi drops it when I ask her only about half the 
time. If she refuses to drop it, it means either that she's inviting a game of keep-away, or 
that she wants to rest with her toy" (117). Her narrative uses the simple tense with no 
tense modifiers to describe the meaning of Safi's actions. 
Opposed to this scientific language is Costello's analysis of the chimpanzee in 
Ruth Orkin's experiment. She always starts her sentences with some type of adverb such 
as "maybe" or "perhaps" that reminds us of the possibilities for other different 
interpretations. She also uses modals such as "could" or "may" to lessen the certainty of 
her facts. As she states, "in her mind, the two piles could have a less obvious meaning" 
and "she may have been saying that she preferred to be among the free" (84). This puts 
the scientific fact into perspective and proposes that even the most objective of facts is 
inherently an interpretative action. 
Costello's attempt to provide other interpretations to scientific facts about 
nonhuman animals and to make the participants in the discussion aware of the 
constructed nature of the scientific discourse doesn't result in a good outcome. Towards 
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the end of dinner, Norma, an analytic philosopher who is responding to Costello's 
arguments, monopolizes the conversation. The open discussion slowly turns into a 
situation in which Norma is indirectly attacking Costello's view on vegetarianism. Norma 
starts by making a claim that the traditions that have legitimized eating meat-mainly 
religious ones-do not influence the current scenario. As she says, "people in the modern 
world no longer decide their diet on the basis of whether they have divine permission" 
(87). Shortly Norma asks for Costello's confirmation, "Wouldn't you agree, Elizabeth?" 
(87). Costello, however, is aware of the situation and keeps her answers to a minimum 
even though she notices the hostility: "But what is the game she is playing? Is there a trap 
she is leading his mother into?" (87). The narrator ponders on the possible outcomes of 
the conversation. 
Finally, Norma comes out with a point that contradicts Costello's ideas and ends 
the conversation: she accuses vegetarianism of being a form of self-definition as an elite 
group. Norma states, "And maybe, ... the whole notion of cleanness versus uncleanness 
has a completely different function, namely, to enable certain groups to self-define, 
negatively, as elite, as elected" (87). Costello then rebuts this accusation with a story 
about Gandhi and how his vegetarianism only served to ostracize him, and not to put him 
in an elitist position. However, Costello's response is only further rebutted by Norma and 
the other scholars in what ceases to be a discussion and becomes a lecture by Norma. 
The dinner ends on a sour note of confusion and disconnection. Dean Arendt 
responds to the discussion on vegetarianism and opens the floor for Costello who "merely 
looks confused, grey and tired and confused" (89). Her son then suggests that this be the 
end of dinner, and she delivers one last remark: "I don't know what I think, ... I often 
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wonder what thinking is, what understanding is. Do we really understand the universe 
better than animals do?" (90). Norma tries to rebut this last remark but is cut off by the 
closing comments of President Garrard. The discussion ends with no consensus on the 
relationship of humans and nonhumans; mere confusion. 
During the next day, Costello lectures again at the university and this time is 
questioned harshly by Thomas O'Hearne, professor of philosophy at Appleton College. 
In one of her last responses to his questions, she reveals her disbelief in the 
communication between different scholars when the basis is reason. As she states, 
"Discussion is possible only when there is a common ground .... On the present 
occasion, however, I'm not sure I want to concede that I share reason with my opponent. 
Not when reason is what underpins the whole long philosophical tradition to which he 
belongs" (112). The discussion the night before at the dinner table has illustrated how 
reason alone cannot reach definitive conclusions when discussing the status of nonhuman 
animals. 
Thus, only by understanding the nuances of language use in the sciences and other 
disciplines one can rethink the way we talk about nonhuman animals and consider other 
interpretations and possibilities of scientific facts. Through the use of metafiction, 
Coetzee is able to put the discourses of science into perspective and make the reader 
think about the different ways we speak about nonhuman animals. 
Coetzee is thus urging the reader to think about the importance of achieving 
common ground between disciplines and thinking about how we speak about nonhuman 
animals. As Latour notices, "the only reasonable, the only realistic way for a mind to 
speak truthfully about the world is to reconnect through as many relations and vessels as 
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possible within the rich vascularization that makes science flow" (113). It is only by 
working at the communications between different fields that we can hope to think about 
the how we are speaking about nonhuman animals. It is only by becoming posthumanist 
that we can start to promote these interrelations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Elizabeth Costello ends her dinner after her first lecture utterly tired and 
disappointed. Her final remarks are: "I don't know what to think .... I often wonder what 
thinking is, what understanding is. Do we really understand the universe better than 
animals do?" (90). Her failure to communicate with other scholars from Appleton 
University as well as her difficult with philosophy when speaking about nonhuman 
animals illustrate much of the current condition of the field of critical animal studies 
within the academia. 
Discussions about the status of nonhuman animals in the disciplines are becoming 
more and more a center of focus. Different disciplines have approached this topic from a 
wide range of perspectives. While philosophy discusses the ethics behind animal rights, 
bioethics questions the use of animals in scientific research. While agriculture reflects on 
the impact of cattle in the environment, biology theorizes on the effects of global 
warming. Now, more than ever, the question of the animal-and its relation to the 
environment-starts to become a central theme in discussions that range across the 
university. Paradoxically, while the conversation in the university opens more to the 
criticism of animal abuse and animal rights, we have reached an unprecedented level of 
mass killing of animals for human consumption. Besides, focus on the use of nonhuman 
animals in other facets of our society is growing in the media for the past couple of 
decades: the issues of puppy-mills, horse slaughters, whale killing, shark finning, avian 
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flu, swine flu, mad cow disease, as well as oil spill disaster, to name but a few, have been 
persistent subjects of headlines in the past few years. 
While each different discipline has been approaching the subject and introducing 
new ways to theorize about the question of the animal, literature, Coetzee suggests, can 
be key in making us aware of the ways we have been talking about nonhuman others, the 
multiplicity of discourses, and how these are at once a barrier to and, perhaps, an avenue 
towards a fuller understanding of the relations between animals and humans. Literature 
has the power to put the discourses of several disciplines into perspective and allow us to 
criticize them and understand the implications of speaking about their subjects the way 
they do. Literature can attempt what Giorgio Agamben suggested as the profanation of 
the disciplinary discourses that center the power of research. 
Coetze's work shows us just that. In using a metafictional frame to portray 
conversations in philosophy and science, he is forcing us to rethink the way each field has 
been talking about nonhuman others. He brings the discourses of both philosophy and 
science down to be examined closely. We are thus able to reflect on how each discipline 
uses language to construct its truth and suppose different forms of interpreting those 
truths. 
Coetzee shows how the philosophical models that serve as a basis for animal 
rights, in employing the language of philosophical inquiry, can sometimes deflect from 
the issues at hand. He also suggests that literature, when committed to imagining others' 
lives, can help us have an understanding of suffering. Bringing back literature to the 
Republic may open up understanding across disciplines and, perhaps, across species. 
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His fiction recognizes Peter Singers's importance in establishing the field of 
animal studies and the necessity for activism but also demonstrates a tension between the 
philosophical basis of animal-rights movements and the desire to move beyond the 
paradigms toward action. His Elizabeth Costello suggests a focus on sympathetic 
imagination, or using fiction to imagine the life of other beings, without deflecting it 
through the use of philosophical language. By the devices of literature, we can construct 
narratives that may show other possibilities of thought for nonhuman animals. 
When portraying scholars from the field of science discussing experiments related 
to nonhuman animals, Coetzee makes it evident what Bruno Latour designates as an 
obsession in science for clear and objective language. Elizabeth Costello's responses to 
each scientific claim suggest that even the most objective scientific account is still 
permeated by subjectivity and has to go through the process of interpretation. When Ruth 
Orkin speaks about the experiment on a chimpanzee to determine the animal's ability to 
reason, Costello offers other possible interpretations of the results. Her responses employ 
a language that is constantly modulated to sound less like dictums and more like 
wondering. Placed vis-a-vis the language employed by scholars of science, her 
interventions expose the forms through which science constructs its facts and the 
underlying paradigms of those constructions. 
Costello's commentaries on the nature of thought at the beginning of this section 
are sparked by her disappointment with the miscommunication present in her visit with 
scholars of Appleton College. Even though President Garrard and Dean Arendt are 
courteous to Costello and compliment her on the lecture and her comments during dinner, 
many of the other professors present-and Norma-question Costello's ideas with a 
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subtle but recurring hostility. In order to defend their points of view, they make use of 
arguments from their own disciplines and evade her questions when they are not phrased 
within the assumptions and methods of their research. She is tired and disappointed in 
how each scholar, tied to the particulars of their disciplines, is unable to communicate. 
Her exhaustion comes from struggling with the anthropo- and logocentric basis of many 
scholars in our university. Even though Elizabeth Costello herself is unsure where she 
stands in this debate, ultimately, Coetzee' s work is a kind of criticism of this form of 
logocentrism and a suggestion that we attempt to move past it. 
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